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CinemaScope’s Chinese Journey:
The Technological Modernisation 
and the Logistics of Perception of 
the Cold War
L I N G  K A N G  
ABSTRACT: This article argues that the advent of the technological system of CinemaScope in socialist China should be understood as 
a historical product of the specific material, cultural, and political conditions and configuration of the Cold War. On the one hand, it is 
the cultural network of the communist bloc that enabled China to obtain this new technology of media infrastructure. On the other 
hand, the social discourse of CinemaScope embodies the Manichaean Cold War narrative that worked to justify the political-ideological 
supremacy of communism by articulating a technological modernisation superior to the capitalist model. What is more, CinemaScope 
also bespeaks the logistics of perception that effectively turns people’s perceptual experience into a political battlefield of the Cold War.
KEYWORDS: CinemaScope, socialist China, Cold War, cinematic technology, the logistics of perception, Sino-Soviet relations, 
technological modernisation.
Introduction: CinemaScope on the night of the 
Party’s anniversary ： 
On the night of 1 July 1957, the thirty-sixth anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Prime Minister Zhou Enlai 周恩來 went to see a movie. This was 
apparently not a leisure activity. Along with him were Deputy Prime Minister 
Chen Yi 陳毅, Minister of Culture Mao Dun 茅盾, the representative of the 
Soviet Embassy in China, P. A. Abrasimov, and almost all the top leaders 
in the cultural sector of the Chinese government, not to mention film 
directors, playwrights, actors and actresses, engineers and technicians from 
both China and the Soviet Union. Together, they were there to celebrate the 
inauguration of China’s first CinemaScope (kuanyinmu litisheng 寬銀幕立
體聲, literally “widescreen stereophonic”) movie theatre, the Capital Theatre 
(Shoudu dianyingyuan 首都電影院).1
The debut of CinemaScope in China was a long-anticipated event. 
During the early People’s Republic of China (PRC) period, the technology 
of widescreen cinema attracted a huge amount of state investment, 
social resources, and public interest. Although its implementation 
required a thorough reformation of the process of film (re)production 
(the reconstruction of film studios and movie theatres, the updating of 
mechanical devices, the procedures and techniques of film-making, the 
institutional realignment and redistribution of personnel and resources, 
etc.), it did not prevent Chinese filmmakers from fully embracing this new 
technological system. While more detailed discussions of the phenomenon 
and its significance will be provided in the following sections, it suffices to 
say here that Zhou’s visit on the night of the Party’s anniversary marked the 
culmination of concurrent attention to CinemaScope among the state and 
the public. Not surprisingly, the new theatre enjoyed instantaneous success. 
All the tickets were sold out in just one hour. The theatre was booked until 
the end of September within one day after registration started. To meet the 
demand, it had to keep increasing the number of screenings per day, with 
the first session starting as early as 6:30 in the morning (Chen 1957: 27-9).2 
Soon after that, more theatres in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin, and Nanjing 
started renovating to install the new system, along with the inception of 
production plans for several widescreen films.
What significance did this particular cinematic format have for 
communist China in its early years that merited so much cultural, economic, 
and political investment? Media reports at the time never for a second 
forgot to attribute the format’s appeal to its technological parameters – 
its screen (curved!) was 2.5 times larger than the old one, its stereophonic 
system comprised eighteen speakers as opposed to the original mono 
system, etc. Following the orbit, official and scholarly accounts adopted a 
similar technological determinism by interpreting the system as a significant 
peer-reviewed article
1. “我國第一座寬銀幕立體聲電影院開幕” (Woguo diyizuo kuanyinmu litisheng dianyingyuan 
kaimu, The inauguration of the first CinemaScope movie theatre of our country), Xinhua News 
Agency, 1 July 1957. 
2.  The film screened that night was a Soviet work, Prologue of Revolution (Geming de qianzou 革命
的前奏). Throughout its run, it had 1,062 screenings with a total audience of 960,000 (Chen 2005: 
444).
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step in the teleological process of technological progress that would better 
serve the interests of the film audience (Qiao 2005; Xu 2005). However, as 
Jonathan Sterne (2003: 2) reminds us, the development of media technology 
cannot be fully understood by “considering simple mechanical possibility.” 
Rather, it always “crystallized and combined larger cultural currents.” This 
is especially true for CinemaScope. For this large-scale, state-sanctioned 
endeavour, an adequate understanding of it must grasp the fetishization of 
its technological characteristics as the crystallisation of the complex nexus of 
material, cultural, and political conditions at this specific historical juncture.
This article takes up the task. However, it does not attempt to offer a 
comprehensive history of CinemaScope. Rather, I argue that the advent of 
CinemaScope in China should be understood as the historical product of the 
country’s involvement in the cultural Cold War between the communist and 
the capitalist camps. Coined by Frances Stonor Saunders (2001), the notion 
of cultural Cold War points to the field of conflict and contestation beyond 
the realm of military deployment and political antagonism in which the Cold 
War rivals competed for ideological supremacy through cultural mediums 
such as film, radio, literature, and mass media. While the literature on the 
writers, artists, institutions, and policies of the two superpowers, the USSR 
and the US, is now voluminous, more accounts on how the cultural Cold War 
took shape in China are still needed. Xiaojue Wang has demonstrated that 
the Cold War discourse was deeply ingrained in the competing visions of 
Chinese modernity across the Bamboo Curtain. She examines how different 
writers in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan contested and overcame 
the dichotomous Cold War discourse and its “Manichaean myth of clash 
between the forces of good and evil, capitalism and communism, democracy 
and authoritarianism” (Wang 2013: 4). For Nicolai Volland, the story of 
the Cold War in China is not just one between the two camps, but also 
within the communist bloc itself. He reveals the dynamic cultural network 
among communist countries in which the fervent interactions among 
writers, circulation of texts, and translation of literary themes and subjects 
constituted their own cultural universe. The cultural Cold War is thus not 
just “Manichaean,” it is “singular and dualistic at the same time” (Volland 
2017: 6).
The history of CinemaScope betrays a similar “singular and dualistic” 
nature. To elaborate, this article will consist of three sections. Firstly, 
tracking the knowledge transfer of CinemaScope from the Soviet Union 
to China, I argue that the communist bloc constituted a transnational 
network of film production that made it possible for China to obtain this 
new media technology. In other words, the Cold War division not only 
draws an ideological boundary, but also demarcates the global transfer of 
technological knowledge of media infrastructure. Rather than being passively 
influenced by the Soviet Union, China actively participated in and utilised 
the network to catch up with cutting-edge technological innovations.
Secondly, like many other technologies, the development of CinemaScope 
was rooted in the Cold War cultural competition that linked art to power 
and turned the achievement of cinematic technology into the indicator of 
political supremacy. Focusing on the social discourse of CinemaScope in 
this section, I point out how the mass media situated CinemaScope in the 
distinct technophilic framework and encoded in it the social imagination 
of the state project of technological modernisation. It spectacularised 
the ideology of the communist state by forging the social spectacle of 
its technological achievements. The narrative of CinemaScope became 
a discursive space in which filmmakers and technicians envisioned and 
articulated a communist technological modernisation both alternative and 
superior to the capitalist one.
Thirdly, enthusiasm for the technology of widescreen cinema during the 
Cold War was also fuelled by what Paul Virilio (1989) terms “the logistics 
of military perception.” Examining the use of cinema in war and military 
propaganda, Virilio contends that cinema becomes a weapon of perception 
due to its ability to create “magical spectacle” that could be used to 
manipulate the perceptual identification and differentiation of its audience. 
Appropriating his notion, I argue that the unprecedented sensory power of 
widescreen cinema made it the perfect tool through which the state could 
(re)define its sensory relationship with its people to construct political 
identification. The development of CinemaScope thus highlights the process 
by which the Cold War turned the realm of human perception into a new 
political battlefield. Underlying the ideological confrontation is a shared 
desire on both sides for a more effective form of technological domination. 
And it was precisely the intensifying Cold War conflict that propelled the 
global expansion of the logistics of perception across the Iron Curtain.
Methodologically, this study combines the approaches of film studies 
and cultural history. Whereas the former allows me to offer an account of 
technological development as well as an analysis of the cinematic text, 
the latter helps me situate them in the Cold War historical context to see 
how their meaning and relevance, rather than being self-evident, were 
generated by the specific social and political discourse. I will base my study 
on prestigious film magazines of the socialist period such as Popular Cinema 
(Dazhong Dianying 大衆電影) and Chinese Cinema (Zhongguo Dianying 
中國電影) to showcase the mainstream understanding of CinemaScope, 
but will also pay specific attention to the long-overlooked vision of 
cinematic technicians by drawing from the leading technological journal 
Cinema Technology (Dianying Jishu 電影技術) as well as translations of 
technological materials. By bringing together both the ideological and the 
technological perspectives, I show how the implementation and discourse 
of CinemaScope provide a lens through which we can better understand the 
discursive and affective frameworks in which the significance of cinematic 
technology was configured and articulated vis-à-vis the cultural Cold War.
Cinematic technology in the Cold War cultural 
network
In the fall of 1956, a team of three Chinese filmmakers – including the 
director Shen Fu 沈浮, the cameraman Luo Congzhou 羅從周, and the 
recordist Miao Zhenyu 苗振宇 – set out on a trip to the Soviet Union. 
Their mission was simple: to learn and bring back the skills and knowledge 
of CinemaScope. Upon their arrival, they were warmly welcomed by their 
Soviet colleagues and soon arranged to work as interns in the respective 
departments of the famous Mosfilm. In the months that followed, they 
not only took courses on the equipment and procedures of CinemaScope 
filmmaking, but also participated in actual film production. The knowledge 
and experience they gained there laid the essential foundation for the 
development of widescreen cinema in China (Shen 1957; Miao 1957).
This was not the first time Chinese film workers went to the Soviet Union 
to learn cinematic technology. Since 1954, multiple teams had gone to 
investigate and learn about the development of the Soviet film industry. 
Such activities were not limited to China and the Soviet Union. Underlying 
them was the vast network of film exchanges among communist countries 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Immediately after the establishment of the PRC, 
film experts from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany 
had already been deeply engaged in the post-war restoration of the film 
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industry in communist China. They directed and cooperated with their 
Chinese colleagues in film productions, reconstructed and standardised 
the management systems and technical procedures of film studios, trained 
and taught Chinese technicians and students in film academies, and built 
new movie theatres and manufactories for mechanical cinematic devices. 
Furthermore, China itself was an important hub in the communist cultural 
network. It not only hosted foreign filmmakers from Vietnam, North Korea, 
Romania, Cuba, and Albania, but also sent its own film experts and exported 
its cinematic devices to those countries (Xu 2005). With limited film imports 
from the Western world, as well as technological blockades, the communist 
bloc constituted its own film universe.
The transference of knowledge of CinemaScope from the Soviet Union 
to China marked only a new episode in this vigorous network. More 
importantly, it points to the technological dimension of film exchange, which 
has not gained enough scholarly attention (Chen 2009). While previous 
studies on the Sino-Soviet cinematic relationship concentrate mostly 
on the artistic and ideological aspects, especially how the Soviet models 
of aesthetic doctrine, character setting, subject and theme, and filming 
techniques influenced Chinese films, the dissemination of CinemaScope 
and other cinematic technologies in the communist film network suggests 
that the Cold War division drew not only ideological boundaries but also 
material ones demarcating the global circulation of technical knowledge of 
media infrastructure. Through the operation of the network, the films of the 
communist bloc not only shared common aesthetics (especially socialist 
realism) and similar techniques of montage and mise-en-scène, but on a 
more fundamental level were also made with similar mechanical devices and 
technological parameters: cameras, microphones, the acoustic settings of 
film studios and theatres, techniques of costuming and lighting, projectors, 
loudspeakers, screens, etc. In other words, the Cold War network helped 
normalise the media infrastructure of communist cinema. Consequently, 
the affinity of communist films lies not only in their diegetic worlds and 
ideological messages, but also in the extra-diegetic, material disposition of 
their audience’s cinematic experience: the quality of cinematic sound, the 
size and brightness of the screen, the spatial structure of the movie theatre, 
and other sensory perceptions of cinema.
The construction of infrastructure points to something beyond its 
technical functioning. In his theorisation of infrastructure, Brian Larkin (2013: 
329) argues that infrastructures “emerge out of and store within them 
forms of desire and fantasy and can take on fetish-like aspects.” Likewise, 
for Chinese filmmakers and audiences alike, CinemaScope should be viewed 
as a vehicle whereby the desire for “the possibility of being modern, of 
having a future” is transmitted and materialised (Larkin 2013: 333). In Shen 
Fu’s report of the internship, besides a comprehensive introduction to the 
development of CinemaScope in the Soviet Union, he asserted, “The road of 
world cinema in the future is definitely the road of widescreen cinema” (Shen 
1957: 93). When carried out properly, CinemaScope would provide brand 
new possibilities and vocabularies to reconfigure the visual and auditory 
representation of socialist history and reality on screen. In other words, 
CinemaScope was more than a specific technological system. It registered 
the imagination of the future form of cinema.
At that time, the Soviet Union undeniably set the standard for such a 
future. As Volland (2017: 108) points out, the Chinese mass media often 
portrayed the Soviet Union as the most advanced nation on earth. With 
regards to cinema, the Soviet Union had also “made huge accomplishments 
in the development of CinemaScope on the world scale” (Shen 1957: 92). 
Therefore, rather than a new genre of film, CinemaScope was conceived 
more as a new norm of film. China’s quest for CinemaScope marked the 
desire not just to obtain the most advanced technological innovation, 
but also to proclaim its leadership in the global cultural and technological 
competition now and in the future. 
Determined to catch up with its big brother, China mobilised the 
communist cultural network by all available means. In spite of the new-
born country’s limited foreign currency reserves, it managed to purchase a 
large number of foreign filming, recording, and projection devices from the 
Soviet Union and East Germany (Xu 2005: 37-88). The major film journals 
not only introduced the features of CinemaScope in detail, but also covered 
the developments of this system in other communist countries as marking 
significant achievements in both artistic, technological, and even political 
terms (Feng 1955: 95-6; Su 1957: 17-9). As preparation for the system’s 
implementation, film technicians translated numerous academic articles and 
technical manuals for CinemaScope into Chinese, including two foundational 
works: an anthology by the chief engineer of the Beijing Film Studio, Luo 
Jingyu’s 羅靜予, Selected Translations on CinemaScope (Kuanyinmu litisheng 
yiwen xuanji 寬銀幕立體聲電影譯文選集), and Wang Ping’s 王平 translation 
of Vysotsky’s comprehensive monograph CinemaScope Films (Kuanyinmu 
litisheng dianying 寬銀幕立體聲電影). Chinese CinemaScope films were 
sent to the Soviet Union for postproduction work, while Soviet experts were 
invited to China to teach CinemaScope technology and cooperated on the 
future production of widescreen films (Xu 2005: 83-4). Shen, Luo, and Miao’s 
trip to the Soviet was part and parcel of such a grand national trend.
After they came back, they immediately cooperated on the production 
of the first Chinese CinemaScope feature film, New Story of the Old Soldier 
(Laobing xinzhuan 老兵新傳). Released in 1959 as a film celebrating the 
tenth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the 
film functioned as a “model play” that exemplified the new technological 
model of filmmaking. It was selected to represent China in the First 
Moscow International Film Festival in 1959 and won the Silver Medal for 
Technological Achievement. As the chief engineer of the Shanghai Film 
Studio, Lin Shengqing 林聖清, and his colleague Xue Zhichang 薛志
昌 (1959) remarked, the success of this film showed that after studying 
CinemaScope in the Soviet Union, China had caught up with this new stage 
in the development of cinema. With such recognition, Chinese filmmakers 
could assert their forefront position in the race for cinematic technology – 
and for technological modernisation.
The supremacy of communist technological 
modernisation
But what kind of technological modernisation is it? Whereas the previous 
section shows how the communist cultural network enabled China to 
obtain the most cutting-edge cinematic technology that encoded the desire 
“of being modern, of having a future” (Larkin 2013: 333), this section will 
demonstrate the “Manichaean” nature of this imagination of technological 
modernisation. I argue that the social discourse of cinematic technology 
in communist China is informed by the compelling need to overpower the 
absent presence of its Cold War rivalry. The filmmakers, technicians, and 
critics alike turn their narrative of cinematic technology into a discursive 
space in which they can articulate their conception of communist 
technological modernisation (and the underlying communist ideology) that 
are both alternative and superior to the capitalist ones.
The discourse of cinematic technology in communist China was 
characterised by growing technophilia among mass media. Film magazines 
Ling Kang – CinemaScope’s Chinese Journey 
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such as Popular Cinema frequently featured introductory works detailing 
the operation of film studios as well as the concepts, methods, devices, and 
principles of optical recording, magnetic recording, sync sound, dubbing, 
Foley techniques, and so on. In these works, cinematic technology itself 
became a central subject whose significance was articulated external to the 
diegetic world of any single film. In her discussion of Republican cinematic 
discourse, Zhang Zhen (2005: 136-7) suggests that inscribing film within a 
technophilic framework is “no doubt in tune with the May Fourth exaltation 
of enlightenment and modern science.” The discussion of cinematic 
technology in communist China is also associated with the promotion of 
science and technology. What is conspicuous here is the role of the state 
in such promotions. With its massive investment in the construction of 
cinematic infrastructure (film studios, movie theatres, journals, academies, 
research labs, factories, foreign purchases, etc.), communist China maintained 
deep involvement in the business of cinematic technology. The media 
coverage of cinematic technology was thus often inscribed in the state’s 
project of achieving the dream of technological modernisation. The recurrent 
stories and images of the communist state’s grand projects effectively 
tied the development of film technology to the political ideal of national 
construction. More important, as Larkin points out, to the extent that 
technology represents “the power of science to rationally order and control 
the natural world,” the state’s mastery of technology becomes “part of the 
conceptual promise” of its rule and self-justification (Larkin 2008: 7). In this 
sense, the visibility of technology bespeaks the visibility of the state’s power 
to control and manage the objective world in which its citizens dwell.
However, I argue that the assertion of the role of the state not only aims 
to justify its domestic authority and rulership, but also has an important Cold 
War connotation. The media obsession with 國產 (guochan, domestically-
made) cinematic mechanical devices is a telling example here. Every 
guochan device, from camera to projector to microphone to recorder and so 
forth, was markedly celebrated in mass media as displaying the independent 
and magnificent potential of the Chinese people in technological invention. 
The first guochan magnetic sync recording system, for example, not only 
received voluminous media coverage, but was even branded by the Shanghai 
Film Technology Factory as “Leap Forward” (Yuejin pai 躍進牌) to fashion 
its identity as the achievement of the Great Leap Forward movement (Xue 
1959: 7-10). As the slogan of the movement, “To surpass the UK and US,” 
clearly indicates, the movement was deeply embedded in the desire of China 
to compete with and overpower the capitalist world.3 Branding the recording 
system “Leap Forward” thus turned the invention of cinematic technology 
into the political manifestation of China’s determination to “surpass the UK 
and US.”
In other words, the conception of the significance of CinemaScope is 
deeply grounded in the Cold War Manichaean discourse. Caute observes 
that in the Cold War USSR, the state launched an “inventions campaign” 
during which the Soviet Union claimed to have made almost all modern 
technological inventions – telegraph, airplane, steam locomotive, bicycle, 
radar, television, synthetic rubber, penicillin, etc. – independently of or prior 
to the West. By making these claims, the Soviet Union attempted not only 
to “immunise itself against Western achievements,” but also to “vindicate 
their self-respect and destroy the (…) old sense of inferiority” (Caute 2003: 
36-7). The obsession with guochan devices in China arguably showcases a 
similar Cold War mentality that views technological inventions as a means 
of competing for political and ideological superiority. The media reports of 
guochan devices not only publicised the state’s infrastructural projects, but 
also manifested a crucial performative dimension aimed at spectacularising 
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3. For a discussion of the relationship between the Great Leap Forward movement and 
modernisation, see Rana Mitter (2013: 134-7).
the ideology of the communist state by forging the social spectacle of its 
technological achievements.
Comparing the technological specifications of the Soviet Union’s 
widescreen system to America’s, the deputy director of the Chinese 
Cinematic Science and Technology Research Centre, Ma Shouqing 馬
守清 (1959: 20-1), concluded that the Soviet one was evidently better. 
Widescreen cinema, like the “space station the Soviets just launched,” (ibid.: 
20) represented a most glorious achievement exemplifying “the grandeurs of 
communist construction by the Soviet people under the Party’s leadership” 
(ibid.: 20). The deputy director of the Chinese National Film Bureau, Situ 
Huimin 司徒慧敏 (1955: 22-3), also praised the brilliant achievements 
of cinematic science and technology in the Soviet Union, which “left the 
capitalist world far behind” (ibid.: 22). The Soviets “spent only ten years or 
so in catching up with what the capitalist world has accomplished in several 
decades” (ibid.: 22). Associating CinemaScope with the space race – the 
“quintessence of scientific and industrial competition” between the USSR 
and the US (Caute 2003: 38) – these authoritative voices firmly situate 
cinematic technology in the Cold War context. 
More importantly, the superiority of communist CinemaScope was 
manifested not only on the level of technological specifications, but also on 
the deeper level of the developmental logic of cinematic technology and 
its underlying social-political system. For example, Luo Jingyu (1957: 20-2) 
argued that what the rapid progress of cinematic technology in the Soviet 
fundamentally bespoke was that “when people get rid of the exploitative 
social system, the social productivity would necessarily start to increase in 
an unprecedented manner, and the development of science and technology 
would necessarily advance to the leading position in the world” (ibid.: 20). 
The “exploitative social system” here obviously refers to the capitalist 
system. For Chinese filmmakers, the capitalist film industry as exemplified 
by Hollywood constituted the evil other to the technological modernisation 
they proclaimed. The chief editor of Popular Cinema, Jia Ji 賈霽 (1957), 
asserted that the difference between capitalist cinema and communist 
cinema lay in that whereas the former capitalised on commercial film, 
market competition, and corporate investment, the latter conceived its only 
interest as serving the people (renmin 人民), thus representing a different, 
and certainly superior logic in cinematic development. In a similar vein, the 
director of the Central Film Management Bureau, Chen Huangmei 陳荒煤 
(1957), also cautioned that the pursuit of commercial profit would seriously 
undermine the central mission of socialist cinema to serve and educate the 
people through its artistic and social values.
In the discursive framework as such, the history of widescreen cinema is 
fashioned as a perfect case by Chinese filmmakers and critics to articulate 
communism’s superiority over Hollywood’s profit-driven technological 
modernisation. To demonstrate the capitalist system’s intrinsic and 
institutional defects that would necessarily repress the potential of the 
film industry to serve the people, Guan Li 管蠡 (1957: 63-4) recounted the 
history of widescreen cinema in the West since Abel Gance’s invention of 
his multi-camera device in the late 1920s. He argued that Gance’s invention 
failed, not because of its technical flaws, but because the capitalists in the 
film industry back then were “busily calculating their box office incomes” 
(ibid.: 63). They refused this new format for being “too artistic” and lacking 
commercial potential. It was not until the early 1950s – when the film 
industry was facing the economic crisis brought by the rise of television – 
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that businessmen suddenly recalled and appealed for widescreen technology. 
For Guan, such a twist explicitly manifested that “what dominates cinema 
in the capitalist world has always been the box office and commercial 
profitability. They could hardly be reconciled with the pursuit of artistic 
values” (ibid.: 63). Gance’s tragedy was thus “inevitable,” for he was 
only concerned about “the enormous expressive capacity of the art of 
widescreen cinema while being ignorant of investors’ calculations” (ibid.: 
63). Unfortunately, it was the latter that constituted the sole legitimate 
motivation for technological development in the capitalist system.
In comparison, the development of widescreen cinema in the communist 
world assumed a different driving force. Communist countries invested in the 
new format not because it would be profitable, but because the technology 
would “enrich the audience’s visual impression of the beautiful external 
world,” (ibid.: 64) hence “drastically enhancing the sense of reality and 
the emotional affect” (ibid.: 64) of the spectator. In other words, whereas 
the capitalist film industry was manipulated by businessmen and their 
commercial interests, communist countries wanted to make progress in 
widescreen technology for its promising artistic potential.
It is not hard to find historical facts that run counter to Guan’s 
narrative. For example, the 1950s CinemaScope was by no means a simple 
resurrection of Gance’s technology. To use John Belton’s (1988: 28) words, 
“the CinemaScope of 1953 bears only a superficial resemblance to the 
anamorphic technology introduced in the 1920s” (ibid.). CinemaScope 
should be understood as a “multitechnological package” of which 
many components are “made possible only by postwar technological 
development” (ibid.). What is more, market competition with television was 
also not the sole rationale for investment in the widescreen technology. 
Other important factors included the post-war transformation of leisure 
activities, the redistribution of population, changes in middle-class culture, 
and so on (Belton 1992).
However, it is precisely the biased and selective nature of Guan’s 
narrative that attests to its Cold War origin. The difference in the realm of 
cinema gradually translates into the comparison between the two political 
systems, and ultimately into the self-justification of communist ideology. 
Using CinemaScope as a case in point, Chinese filmmakers and technicians 
envisioned communist technological modernisation that was better than 
the capitalist one in terms of both its technological achievements and 
developmental logic. Labelling commercial profitability as the hallmark of 
the capitalist system, they argued for a desirable developmental trajectory 
of cinematic technology (and film industry in general) that would do 
away with, or at least not be solely dominated by, capital flow and market 
concerns. In the communist world, the development of the film industry 
should ultimately be of value to the cultural life of the majority of the 
people. And the mission of cinematic technology was to “serve the people” 
rather than the capitalists (Lin and Xue 1959) – though what constituted the 
interests of the people remained open to the contestation of different forces 
in which the state definitely occupied the dominant role.
Widescreen cinema and the logistics of perception
In the previous two sections, I have discussed how the Cold War cultural 
network among the communist countries enabled the circulation of 
cinematic technology, and how the Chinese filmmakers used the discourse 
of CinemaScope technology to articulate the supremacy of communist 
technological modernisation. However, the historical connection between 
CinemaScope and the Cold War has yet another layer to be investigated: its 
instrumental role in propaganda campaigns.
Compared to other items in the cultural Olympics of the Cold War, 
CinemaScope stands out for its unprecedented sensory impact on human 
perception, which could be used to manipulate the ideological and political 
identification of the spectator. One of the earliest theorists of CinemaScope, 
André Bazin (2014: 271), already saw in CinemaScope a potential to revert 
to “film’s unique superiority” over other media forms: “its potential to deliver 
spectacle.” Similarly, Charles Barr (1963: 9-11) praised CinemaScope for its 
“physical sensation,” “vivid sense of space,” “greater physical involvement,” 
and “sensation of movement.”
However, as Ariel Rogers (2013: 32-5) aptly points out, the huge 
sensory power could also function to “govern the human perceptual 
apparatus.” Immersing the spectator in the widescreen visual experience 
and stereo sound, the bodily experience of CinemaScope would likely “elicit 
psychosomatic responses” and hence “subject the viewer to the ‘will’ of the 
film” and “render audiences susceptible to control from above.”
Such a danger – or rather, potential – naturally found its place in the 
Cold War, in which both sides recognised this capacity as useful to their 
propaganda apparatus. John Belton (1992: 88-90) finds that during the Cold 
War, widescreen technology was often used “as exhibits in national pavilions 
at world’s fairs.” Whereas the United States “defeated the rival exhibit of 
the Soviet Union” in the 1955 Bangkok World Trade Fair, three years later, 
the Soviet Union fought back and won the Grand Prize at the Brussels 
World’s Fair with its widescreen film Great Is My Country. Anti-communist 
intellectuals in the US also warned against “the introduction of stereophonic 
sound and Cinemascope-type screen” in the Soviet Union, worrying that it 
would add “some very strong features in their favor” to Soviet films “designed 
for foreign festivals and for gaining prestige abroad” (Caute 2003: 159).
In the Cold War international propaganda contest, widescreen cinema 
became “a site for polemical confrontation” and “an index of technological 
prowess” (Belton 1992: 90). Caute (2003: 4) points out that the Cold War 
rival systems actually shared a remarkable consensus on a variety of issues, 
including faith in technological modernisation and its power to manage and 
harness the natural world to human needs. With respect to CinemaScope, it 
could be added that the two parties also agreed on the power of technology 
to manage and control human beings themselves. The competition over 
this power served as a significant driving force for the development of 
widescreen technology.
In this sense, I argue that the enthusiasm for CinemaScope during the 
Cold War could be understood in terms of Paul Virilio’s conception of 
“the logistics of military perception.” In his study of the use of cinematic 
technology in war, the French philosopher contends that cinema became 
a significant weapon of perception that could serve the war with its ability 
to produce “magical spectacle.” The spiritual power of the spectacle would 
“captivate” the enemy to manipulate their sense of fear and hope. To the 
extent that the film-as-weapon could “make themselves felt through 
chemical, neurological processes in the sense organs and the central nervous 
system,” it was able to affect “human reactions and even the perceptual 
identification and differentiation of objects” (Virilio 1989: 7-8). It is on this 
perceptual level of war that Virilio  claims that “once the cinema was able to 
create surprise (technological, psychological, etc.), it effectively came under 
the category of weapons” (ibid.: 10). Abel Gance, who is depicted as the poor, 
artistic-minded inventor of the widescreen device in the 1920s by Guan Li’s 
aforementioned narrative of the history of widescreen technology in the 
West, actually worked for the army during WWI. He not only employed real 
soldiers in his films, but his conception of cinema was also close to that of 
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the “war machine.” Virilio  argues that Gance’s invention failed because its 
cinematic power did not catch up with the dynamism of the military: it was 
“incapable of inventing its own atomic bomb” (ibid.: 34).
The notion of the logistics of perception sheds new light on the 
development of CinemaScope in the Cold War. With its greater ability for 
spectacle-creating, CinemaScope arguably served as a better weapon in 
this new military and political battlefield: the realm of human perception. 
However, whereas in “hot” wars, the perceptual weapon of cinema was 
mainly used to bombard “the sense organs and the central nervous system” 
(ibid.: 8) of the enemy, the Cold War was characterised by the physical 
absence of the enemy (with the possible exception of occasions such as 
international exhibition fairs). Therefore, in the Cold War, the major target 
of the cinematic weapon expanded to the domestic audience, while its 
objective became the construction of perceptual identification with the 
political power of the state, be it capitalist or communist.
Chinese CinemaScope films should be read as perceptual weapons of 
the Cold War as well. In a 1956 interview, the chair of the department 
of cinematography of the Beijing Film Academy, Zhu Jinming 朱今明, 
anticipated that future domestic CinemaScope films would exhibit the 
“infinite beauty of our country’s natural landscape” and the “grandeur of 
masses of people gathering in front of Tiananmen Square.” Both scenes bear 
explicit ideological messages of nationalism and the mass politics of the 
state (Reporter 1956: 30-1). In effect, the early production of CinemaScope 
films did follow this principle. For example, the first Chinese CinemaScope 
feature film, New Story of the Old Soldier, extensively featured images 
of natural landscape and the collective masses that had clear political 
connotations. The film tells the story of how former military cadre Lao Zhan 
老戰 volunteered to reclaim the Great Northern Wasteland (Beidahuang 
北大荒, GNW hereafter) in Heilongjiang Province. With the help of 
workers, peasants, and students of agricultural mechanics, Lao Zhan and his 
colleagues finally overcame the harsh natural environment and built the first 
state farm.
The project of mass reclamation of the GNW was in no sense new to 
the audience. Disseminated throughout the state propaganda machine 
since 1948, stories of the project not only eulogised people’s efforts in 
achieving a difficult agricultural project, but also made the wildness of the 
GNW’s natural environment nationally renowned. Film scholars have long 
noticed how the widescreen representation of large-scale natural landscape 
can have a propagandist function. John Belton (1992: 89-90) notes that 
early widescreen films in the United States belonged predominantly to 
the genre of travelogue that often “fetishized the American landscape” by 
“barnstorming through Bryce Canyon, Yosemite, the Grand Canyon, and 
Zion Canyon in Zion National Park.” Displaying “the scenic wonders of 
America to both domestic and foreign audiences,” these scenes carried an 
overt ideological undertone of American patriotism and thus anticipated the 
potential value of the format as “an instrument of American propaganda.”
The representation of the GNW in New Story certainly implicates the 
possibility for the spectators to entertain their fascination with one of the 
country’s most famous “scenic wonders” in the theatre. More than that, 
it takes the ideological function one step further by also displaying the 
spectacle of the people in conquering such scenic wonders. For example, 
in the climax of the film, the camera provides a panoramic view of the 
collective labour of the masses. With people and machines spread out in an 
orderly manner across the vast farmland, the scene not only implies that 
the harsh environment has now been tamed and transformed into an object 
of exploitation by the masses, but also turns the masses themselves into 
a spectacular visual object confronting the spectator. The massive spread-
out complex of the collective covers simultaneously the farmland and the 
audience’s vision, constituting the conquering of nature and of the spectator 
at the same time.
It is in scenes like this that CinemaScope attains its full potential as 
a perceptual-ideological weapon. Whereas the diegesis depicts how the 
people of the new-born communist state put the chaotic and turbulent 
environment into order, allegorically, the natural environment could well 
be read as the international political arena of the Cold War, the antagonism 
of which was no less hostile. Virilio (1989: 51) argues that cinemas “were 
training camps which bonded people together in the face of death agony, 
teaching them to master the fear of what they did not know.” In the 
training camps of CinemaScope, then, images like that certainly functioned 
as logistical supplies for the communist audience. They spectacularised the 
communist ideology of collectivism by turning it into the sensationally 
overwhelming visual representation of the collective. The perceptual impact 
of the images attributed to communism and the communist state an illusory 
power that would purportedly defy any difficulties, and hence better prepare 
the audience to master their fear in the Cold War waged in the fields of both 
politics and perception.
Concluding remarks
Statistics show that in the late 1950s, the annual production of 
CinemaScope films in China accounted for nearly 10% of the total number. 
While we do not have a reliable source of actual audience figures for these 
widescreen films, what we do know is that the number of widescreen 
theatres increased rapidly from nine in 1958 to 17 in 1959 to 50 in 1960 
(CFDEC 1961), while the number of regular theatres increased about 20% 
every year (Chen 2005). However, what is equally if not more important than 
these figures are the social discourses constructed around this technological 
system among technicians, filmmakers, and in mass media. What they 
show, as this article proposes, is that rather than simply a “better” cinematic 
technology in a teleological process of technological improvement, it is more 
productive to understand CinemaScope as a historical product of the specific 
material, cultural, and political conditions and configuration of the Cold War. 
On the one hand, it was the cultural network of the communist bloc that 
enabled China to obtain this new technology of media infrastructure. On the 
other hand, the social discourse of CinemaScope embodied the Manichaean 
Cold War narrative that worked to justify the political-ideological supremacy 
of communism by articulating a technological modernisation superior to the 
capitalist model.
The examination of CinemaScope in turn sheds new light on the 
conception of Cold War. The technology highlights the significant role of 
the logistics of perception on both sides of the rivalry. The binary ideological 
narrative of the Cold War disguised the shared desire to manipulate people’s 
perceptual identification through technological means. The necessity of the 
logistics of military perception constitutes the affective framework in which 
the technological infrastructure of CinemaScope and its affective affordance 
became meaningful.
This explains why, whereas the discourse of CinemaScope is characterised 
by the distinct binary relationship between the communist bloc and the 
capitalist bloc (and the supremacy of one over the other), the technology of 
CinemaScope seems to betray a sense of universality. Although the Soviet 
Union was unquestionably the major source of technological knowledge of 
CinemaScope, Chinese technicians did not turn away devices and references 
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from Western countries. For example, the magnetic film coating machine 
used in the production of New Story was a French product. Luo Jingyu’s 
1957 anthology Selected Translation on CinemaScope, which served as 
a technological guidebook, included articles from the Soviet Union, the 
United States, Britain, France, and the Netherlands. The footnotes of articles 
in technical journals such as Cinema Technology also cited a substantial 
number of publications from the United States.
The universality of the technical parameters of CinemaScope falls outside 
the demarcation of the Cold War binary. It points to the unified Cold War 
modernity of media technology that I classify as the concept of the logistics 
of perception. At the core of the concept is the desire to use the perceptual 
power of media as a tool of ideological manipulation. In this sense, what 
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CinemaScope’s Chinese journey ultimately suggests is that, apart from 
the social, political, and ideological aspects, the Cold War was also a war 
of perception. And it was precisely the intensifying Cold War competition 
that served as the driving force for the global expansion of the logistics of 
perception – in which China was just a new (and certainly not the final) stop.
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